|
|
@@ -821,47 +821,74 @@ To such critics, however, I would respond in communicating that Malthusianism is
|
|
|
When thinking dialectically, we are always in a spiraling course of re-imagining the terms of the world as concepts that are never fully-formed but that are always developing against their contradictions into syntheses which represent the next stage of understanding in the course of human history. As such, we can turn to the use of the dialectic in supposing the manner of thinking which allows the human mind to aspire towards Malthusian principles while desiring the benefits of technology so long as they are in line with a future endpoint of liberated humanity.
|
|
|
|
|
|
1. The dialectic always progresses
|
|
|
-2. Programs are implemented by the state
|
|
|
-3. Excuse will be made similarly to noting that standard of living changes in negative correlation to birth rate, at certain scales
|
|
|
+2. Programs are implemented by the state (because the state represents class consciousness in its most historically correct form)
|
|
|
+3. Excuse will be made similarly to noting that standard of living changes in negative correlation to birth rate
|
|
|
4. A truly scientific society will account for all resource use and thus need to be both developing transhumanistic tech while being sustainable
|
|
|
5. Most transhumanist tech is developed on the basis of treatments which are intended for the masses in a dialogue which includes consideration to overpopulation, such as vaccines
|
|
|
|
|
|
-These considerations can inform our categorical definition of communism, which is just a formal artifact for the logical conclusion of collectivist thinking and which is bound by imminence in that it is an object which relates to every man and, thus, is ontologically consistent with man as a process of engaging in his self-definition. It is not man himself and not necessarily the aggregate of him, nor his geist. It is the object relating all then and serving in such a capacity that, upon its imminent attainment, marks the phase whereupon evidence of man's nature finally manifests by virtue of the conditions which were now made palatable by man's own hand, such as to make him "man in himself".
|
|
|
+!TODO: Do we need the connection between Malthusianism informing the definition of Communism?
|
|
|
+These considerations can inform our categorical definition of Communism, which is just a formal artifact for the logical conclusion of collectivist thinking and which is bound by imminence in that it is an object which relates to every man and, thus, is ontologically consistent with man as a process of engaging in his self-definition. It is not man himself and not necessarily the aggregate of him, nor his geist. It is the object relating all then and serving in such a capacity that, upon its imminent attainment, marks the phase whereupon evidence of man's nature finally manifests by virtue of the conditions which were now made palatable by man's own hand, such as to make him "man in himself".
|
|
|
|
|
|
-Its definition is then the promise that man can and, by virtue of logical extension of such an assumption, should bring about the moment of his true reality. It is the binding of all men to this imminence but it also requires one last contextual element in order to make this understanding complete.
|
|
|
+Its definition is then the promise that man can and, by virtue of the logical extension of such an assumption, should bring about the moment of his true reality. It is the binding of all men to this imminence but it also requires one last contextual element in order to make this understanding complete.
|
|
|
|
|
|
-- A theory of how man proceeds to communism
|
|
|
+- A theory of how man proceeds to Communism
|
|
|
|
|
|
How does this proceed? Through conflict and struggle
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Still Struggle
|
|
|
|
|
|
-Whether old or new, we always see the descriptions of class struggle, regardless of whether one believes the word class to be archaic. It is always the elucidating of dialectical tension driving history as teleological foundation, that this is occurring through critique of world and society, and always within a short handful of hops of Marx himself, neo-Marxists and even newer contemporaries who still keep the Hegelian view of reality. A dialectic examining contradiction and yielding tension. Even if many do it, not as a conscious and intentionally advocated metaphysic, but simply as intuition delivered through cultural critique and moralizing on the juxtaposition of humans grouped and classified on their appearance, reproductive strategy, association, sexual interests or preoccupation, or any other dimension of oppression and social division.
|
|
|
+Whether old or new, we always see the descriptions of class struggle, regardless of whether one believes the word class to be archaic. It is always the elucidating of dialectical tension driving history as teleological foundation, that this is occurring through critique of world and society, and always within a short handful of hops of Marx himself, neo-Marxists and even newer contemporaries who might denounce him while still maintaining what exhibits a Hegelian view of reality. A dialectic examining contradiction and yielding tension. Even if many do it, not through a conscious and intentionally-advocated metaphysic, but simply as intuition delivered through cultural critique and moralization on the juxtaposition of humans grouped and classified on their appearance, reproductive strategy, association, sexual preoccupation, or any other dimension of social division and oppression.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+> "... capitalist society reality is – immediately – the same for both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, remains unaltered. But we may now add that this same reality employs the motor of class interests to keep the bourgeoisie imprisoned within this immediacy while forcing the proletariat to go beyond it." - Gyorg Lukács (History and Class Consciousness)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+> "The Communist Party is an autonomous form of proletarian class consciousness serving the interests of the revolution." - Gyorg Lukács (History and Class Consciousness)
|
|
|
|
|
|
## Remark
|
|
|
|
|
|
-And another note on the Hegelian view may be necessary to illustrate why these observations and the noted aspects of the methodologies being utilized are not simply chosen for their vulnerability in social critique.
|
|
|
+I want to be very clear that I'm not contributing these observations and opinions simply because I think that they offer an easy critique of some vulnerable aspect of institutions, the state, a cultural domain, or any recognizable arena of discourse.
|
|
|
|
|
|
TODO: this is the right content, but it needs to be refactored
|
|
|
-These are not ephemeral, cultural or occurring through happenstance. We are identifying the base; the fundamental aspect not necessarily by which it functions, but the mechanism by which its employers believe it functions - and that this will be shown to not necessarily be the case as per a formal understanding (though there are certainly those for whom that is the case), but that it is implicit as it is taken up by those who adopt the language and syntax and utilize it in the context through which it is presented.
|
|
|
+The referenced characteristics in critiques of phenomena which I describe as being either collectivist cult manifestations or conducive to collectivist social transformation are not ephemeral, cultural or that which has occurred through happenstance. We are identifying the base; the fundamental aspect and mechanism by which its employers and proponents believe it functions and we should be able to see that it's not just necessarily the case that they are progressed or implemented as per a formal understanding (though there is certainly no limit to that), but that it is implicit as it is taken up by those who adopt the language and syntax and utilize it in the context through which it is presented.
|
|
|
|
|
|
-The notion being alluded to is that of dialectics as they've been provided, not through the formulators (Greeks, Romans), and their predecessors and anteceding thinkers, but the German idealists who have massaged, processed and supposedly evolved the method, as well as those who contributed to its use in a way which brought it to having been framed as a feature of enlightenment thought, such as Rousseau, and now especially as its usage in popular culture and, sadly, science.
|
|
|
+The notion being alluded to is that of dialectics as they've been provided, not through the formulators (Greeks, Romans), and their predecessors and anteceding thinkers, but the German idealists who have massaged, processed and supposedly evolved the method, as well as those who contributed to its use in a way which brought it to having been framed as a feature of enlightenment thought, such as Rousseau, and now especially as its usage in popular culture and, sadly, academic institutions including those pertaining to the sciences, at least to the extent that activism has entered such institutions which is, in all veracity, almost all of them.
|
|
|
|
|
|
-Though it seems perfectly valid and reasonable to choose to deepen one's understanding of any given concept or cognizable artifact, that is through universal application as it relates to individual thinking - reflected upon and perhaps leading to communicable thought and that the weight of its impact through man and society is only to be found in the degree to which one, themselves, has been affected in thought or in their person, or to the degree to which one communication serves as effective rhetoric.
|
|
|
+Just as, with modern usage of the dialectic through aspiration to idealism leaves all terms ambiguous, we can see how thinkers like Rousseau are understood to be enlightenment thinkers for certain characteristics which ultimately contradict the association. That is to say, Rousseau is thought of as being an enlightenment thinker, while putting forward ideas that are clearly anti-enlightenment or skeptical of it. Kant is much the same way, having contributed much to modern dialectic in a manner which makes hib]]]]]
|
|
|
|
|
|
-For the Hegelian and supposedly post-Hegelian, the tension moves beyond mere intellectual pursuit.
|
|
|
+Though it seems perfectly valid and reasonable to choose to deepen one's understanding of any given concept or cognizable artifact, that is, through universal application of deep thought, using comparison of terms as it they can be related in an individual's thinking, and by having reflected sufficiently to perhaps lead a represented understanding to the point of communicable thought. Classically, when considering the use of dialectics, the weight of its impact through man and society is only to be found in the degree to which one is affected by the process, and the degree to which impact can be made through effective rhetoric.
|
|
|
|
|
|
-For the purist, active under the assumption of a world and reality which are fundamentally idealist is something which can come to pass either through one's competence in Hegel's New Platonic elucidations, but it can also take a more implicit form.
|
|
|
+For the Hegelian and supposedly post-Hegelian, the tension moves beyond mere intellectual pursuit, even if the work itself can be thought of as being one. They are not simply driven by a desire for intellectual prowess or intellectual dominance, but through an insistence on metaphysical dominance. This is the difference which allows for one to continue their forward charge, even after a loss of confidence in the veracity of their position in the traditional sense. The veracity of the current understanding of the world can always be superseded with the veracity of one's commitment to an as-of-yet unrealized point of termination - if it has not yet come to be, we'll always be en route towards its coming to be.
|
|
|
|
|
|
-That is because this tendency towards idealism isn't an artificial programming yielding from one's having encountered the ideas of Plato or Hegel, even if they give such ideas a seemingly robust structure. On the contrary, the disposition of idealism is a very human one which begins in every human's early phase of life.
|
|
|
+For dialectical purist, believing in the fundamental description of reality through a post-Hegelian thinker, such as Marx or Lukács, they come to be active under the assumption of a world and reality which are fundamentally idealist and that those things which are to pass will be doing so as an analog of forms to coming to pass as ideal forms as though it would be found in a Neo-Platonic elucidation. More concerning than the mysticism-infused behaviour, however, is that the dialectical mode of thought can take a more implicit form.
|
|
|
|
|
|
-# Perceptual frame
|
|
|
+That is because this tendency towards idealism isn't an artificial programming yielding from one's having encountered the ideas of Plato or Hegel, even if they give such ideas a seemingly robust structure. On the contrary, the disposition of idealism is a very human one which begins in every human's early phase of life. It's a tendency which causes us to admire idealism, even in our antagonizers, and even at the very moment of conflict.
|
|
|
|
|
|
-The perceptual frame is the first phenomenon, as phenomenon in itself (to borrow some Hegelian terminology) that we each experience, and it is not an aspect of our experience from which we ever depart, lest we depart from experience altogether.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-This means that we begin with something at least approximating an idealist view, not in the sense of having some advanced opinion as to how all things should be, but in the sense that we can reasonably agree that the entirety of what can be scientifically observed as the perception, interpretation, and sustainment of the sense apparatus of a human person is tantamount to being some or all of what we describe as human mind, human consciousness, and, especially, something which extends from a human having thoughts.
|
|
|
+# Perceptual frame
|
|
|
|
|
|
-This isn't an argument as to whether a human has thoughts to the exclusion of other animals, but that we are examining the experience of having a human body, what it might be disposed to perceiving of that experience, and how that should inform our opinions about what it means for a human to proclaim, define, or associate with some referenceable manner of thinking (in this case, Idealism).
|
|
|
+┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
|
|
|
+│ │
|
|
|
+│ ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐ │
|
|
|
+│ ┌┴──┬──────────────┐ ┌───────┐ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ ┌───────────┼──┬─────┘ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ └──│───────────┘ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ └──┐ └──────────────┤ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ │ │ │ │ │
|
|
|
+│ └────────────────┐ └─────────────┘ │ │
|
|
|
+│ └──────────────────┘ │
|
|
|
+│ │
|
|
|
+└──────────────────────────────────────────┘
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+> "But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. The perceptual frame is the first phenomenon, as phenomenon in itself (to borrow some Hegelian terminology) that we each experience, and it is not an aspect of our experience from which we ever depart, lest we depart from experience altogether." - Karl Marx (Das Kapital)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+This means that we begin with something at least approximating an idealist view, not in the sense of having some advanced or fully-formed opinion as to how all things should be, but in the sense that we can reasonably agree that the entirety of what can be scientifically observed as the perception, interpretation, and sustainment of the sense apparatus of a human person is tantamount to being some or all of what we describe as human mind, human consciousness, and, especially, something which extends from a human having thoughts.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+This isn't an argument as to whether a human has thoughts to the exclusion of other animals, but that we are examining the experience of having a human body, what it might be disposed to perceiving of that experience, and how that should inform our opinions about what it means for a human to proclaim, define, or associate with some referenceable manner of thinking (such as Idealism).
|
|
|
|
|
|
Even if it were the case that their experience was absent the sense apparatus, some might call it a perception less tainted and others might say it lacks relevance insofar as the experience lacks environmental context, but then if there were any content at all, it would be as a realm of ideas, especially as can be imagined as an experiment in mind, for it is easy enough to see that if truly an experience could be had which was completely devoid of content, then it would be oblivious and so for every case our conception holds relevant.
|
|
|
|
|
|
@@ -872,7 +899,7 @@ The main point is that we need to learn to understand and even intuit that:
|
|
|
- there is an environment which seems to exist independent of my consciousness and will
|
|
|
|
|
|
# Hegelian Framing
|
|
|
-> Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and ) Marxism. This is the aspect of the matter (it is not an aspect, but the essence of the matter). - Lenin
|
|
|
+> Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and ) Marxism. This is the aspect of the matter (it is not an aspect, but the essence of the matter). - Lenin (Lenin’s Collected Works)
|
|
|
|
|
|
Coming back to the point of what precisely is the Hegelian view, Hegelian faith, or Hegelian application of dialectic, we can now make clear the distinction.
|
|
|
|
