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colourblindness

Emmanuel Buckshi 3 weeks ago
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      Book/DRAFT.md

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Book/DRAFT.md

@@ -886,32 +886,37 @@ That is because this tendency towards idealism isn't an artificial programming y
 
 > "But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. The perceptual frame is the first phenomenon, as phenomenon in itself (to borrow some Hegelian terminology) that we each experience, and it is not an aspect of our experience from which we ever depart, lest we depart from experience altogether." - Karl Marx (Das Kapital)
 
-This means that we begin with something at least approximating an idealist view, not in the sense of having some advanced or fully-formed opinion as to how all things should be, but in the sense that we can reasonably agree that the entirety of what can be scientifically observed as the perception, interpretation, and sustainment of the sense apparatus of a human person is tantamount to being some or all of what we describe as human mind, human consciousness, and, especially, something which extends from a human having thoughts.
+We begin with something approximating an idealist view, not in the sense of having some advanced or fully-formed opinion as to how all things should be, but in the sense that we can reasonably agree that the entirety of what can be scientifically observed as the perception, interpretation and sustainment of the sense apparatus of a human person is tantamount to incurring all of what is described as human mind, human consciousness and, especially, something which extends from a human having thoughts.
 
-This isn't an argument as to whether a human has thoughts to the exclusion of other animals, but that we are examining the experience of having a human body, what it might be disposed to perceiving of that experience, and how that should inform our opinions about what it means for a human to proclaim, define, or associate with some referenceable manner of thinking (such as Idealism).
+This isn't an argument as to whether a human has thoughts to the exclusion of other animals, but that we are examining the experience of having a human body, what it might be disposed to perceiving of that experience, and how that should inform our opinions about what it means for a human to proclaim, define or association with some referenceable manner of thought, such as Idealism, and that this occurs either in a process of thought which is only available to humans or which is distinctly human
 
-Even if it were the case that their experience was absent the sense apparatus, some might call it a perception less tainted and others might say it lacks relevance insofar as the experience lacks environmental context, but then if there were any content at all, it would be as a realm of ideas, especially as can be imagined as an experiment in mind, for it is easy enough to see that if truly an experience could be had which was completely devoid of content, then it would be oblivious and so for every case our conception holds relevant.
+Even if it were the case that their experience was absent the sense apparatus, to any degree, some might call it a perception less-tainted and others might say it lacks relevance insofar as the experience lacks environmental context, but then if there were any content at all, it would be as a realm of ideas, especially as can be imagined as an experiment in mind, for it is easy enough to see that if truly an experience could be had which was completely devoid of content, then it would be an oblivious experience and still maintaining a form which is fundamentally idealist, save for an instance where no thought occurs whatsoever.
 
-If at base of development we are already at a mode of perception which may plausibly be perceiving such to assume that the (one's own) frame of perception is the only one in existence, or the only type of perception that may be perceived but could be perceived in multiple instances, or otherwise as a perception whose outlook from the subject (perceiver) looks (TODO: what is this? -> you could even imagine a cultish formation insisting on what is perceived, or how and in what way or per what quantity and that in isolation it would be the only meaningful perception). Far less likely would it be to envision a cult which believes an isolated perception with no sensory input as being void of thought or state of mind - such a thing is not even alleged of those who reach a vegetative state, except maybe at that final limit.
+If at the base of development we are already at a mode of perception which may plausibly be perceiving such to assume that one's own frame of perception is the only one in existence, or the only type of perception that may be experienced but that somehow could translate into multiple perceptions, such as multiple instances of the same perception, or otherwise as a perception whose outlook from the subject (perceiver) looks as an imagined, cultish formation insisting on what is perceived, or how and in what way or per what quantities perception could take place, and that in isolation it would be the only meaningful perception, then still these observations concerning the natural tendencies of human perception would still hold. Far less likely would it be to envision a cult which believes an isolated perception with no sensory input as being void of thought or a state of mind as being one of a vegetative state, except as a final limit.
+
+!WARNING: That last paragraph was rough.
 
 The main point is that we need to learn to understand and even intuit that:
-- others likely have a perception, too
-- there is an environment which seems to exist independent of my consciousness and will
+- Others likely have a perception, too
+- There is at minimum an environment which appears to exist independent of one's consciousness or will
 
 # Hegelian Framing
 > Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and ) Marxism. This is the aspect of the matter (it is not an aspect, but the essence of the matter). - Lenin (Lenin’s Collected Works)
 
 Coming back to the point of what precisely is the Hegelian view, Hegelian faith, or Hegelian application of dialectic, we can now make clear the distinction.
 
-(It is worth mentioning that Stephen Coughlin would advise on the topic and remind us that we needn't wade into the flavours and interpretations of Hegel's dialectic all too much, lest we find ourselves in it -> the important point is to recognize the worldview is itself dialectical and that this is as a matter of teleology).
+## Digression (Unconstrained Analytics)
+- It is worth mentioning that Stephen Coughlin would advise on the topic and remind us that we needn't wade into the flavours and interpretations of Hegel's dialectic all too much, lest we find ourselves in it -> the important point is to recognize the worldview is itself dialectical and that this is as a matter of teleology.
 
-Whereas classically, and as an intellectual pursuit, dialectics consists of examining what is not understood by examining what contradictions can be found, or what oppositional terms and concepts can be set in conflict with one another (generally as per their relationship to something already cognizable), and using the tension brought out about the dual items of consideration to invigorate the drive towards one's better understanding, but Hegel's is different:
-- dialectical tension occurs in all things
-- dialectical process is the engine of change
-- dialectical tension evokes change and this is what drives history
-- this movement in history is heading towards a moment of resolution
+## Hegelian Impendence
+Whereas classically, and as an intellectual pursuit, dialectics consists of examining what is not understood by examining what contradictions can be found, or what oppositional terms and concepts can be set in conflict with one another (generally as per their relationship to something already cognizable), and using the tension brought out through the dualistic analysis of the corresponding items to invigorate the drive towards one's better understanding, but Hegel's is different:
+- Dialectical tension occurs in all things
+- Dialectical process is the engine of change
+- Dialectical tension evokes change and this is what drives history
+- This movement in history is heading towards a moment of resolution
+- Semantically: utilizing negation against an abstract understanding in order to yield something substantive
 
-Some would call this imminentization or eschatological in that all that occurs is in the context of this endpoint in order for the occurrences to be considered in their most reasonable representation. Some might also call this being scientific, or applying a scientific analysis.
+Some would call this an imminentization or that something is eschatological, which is to say: all things occur in the context of an endpoint. By endpoint, we mean an end to a period of history. In order for the occurrences to be considered in their most reasonable representation (reasonable in the sense that if there is any relevance to something, it is in the fact of it having existed in the context of all things, thus giving rise to consider that the most complete understanding of anything is in the context of everything). Some might also call this being scientific, or applying a scientific analysis.
 
 That isn't to say that an intellectual pursuit of comparing terms, concepts or ideas shouldn't be expected to move towards better understanding -> of course it would insofar as someone decides to apply focus and attention. You cannot progress on understanding if you are not paying attention to the thing in question, but there is a difference in saying that focus and attention to X shall result in some manner of improved capacity to grapple with "X" in general -> this could be improvement through achieving a particular level of competence - through having done some expert-level action or gaining expert level insight - but it might simply be that the improvement through one's having made the subject more temporally relevant.
 
@@ -923,7 +928,21 @@ The eschatological change is one of human conception - at least to be understood
 
 For Hegel, this comes about through all manner of dialectical thought as the understanding of all things includes an unresolved tension and process of reflection occurring in tandem with negation as sublation (TODO: perhaps rephrase that a little). In his idealist formulation, all these things ultimately exist as ideas which are aspects of a totality and this is synonymous with Divinity or the Divine.
 
-*Remark: There is something to be said here about the insistence of being able to represent things in idealist terms. The problem about ascribing idealism to someone's view is that even if they themselves proclaim themselves as idealists, we can't really understand what's going on with anyone at whatever time they're speaking or as they're rationalizing something in mind, discourse or otherwise. I want to take the approach that we all likely go through modes of conception, perhaps even at all times, which are compatible with what we describe as idealism. We already agree that there is a subject/object split to a degree that a human being cannot look at any object and understand it in absolute terms - its complete structure, nature, composition, context towards a purpose, or whether it exists in context of no purpose at all. We can observe it and understand things about it and make inferences or contemplate shapes or feelings or patterns or concepts that are invoked or somehow influenced by it. Even if we are creating a geometric model or represented image as per our nervous system engaging with the object, or our conception of the object, and the activity of our visual cortex, that image is not the thing in question, and though by itself makes it an idea in its own rite and not necessarily the idea of the thing it's purported to be in reference to. The idea exists as an abstraction, and further abstractions are conjured even upon reflecting on the experience of perceiving that thing in question. It's difficult to really express the degree to which this can make a huge difference in someone's thinking*
+### Final Events in Historical Periods
+
+There is a difference between the idea of an endpoint as the final event of history, because it sounds much more religious, mystical, cataclysmic, cosmologically relevant, and so forth. It's the final occurrence of all that could be, from the perspective of how existence and, say, the universe appear for a human mind.
+
+With Hegel, his idea of an eschatological endpoint, which isn't how he describe it, was that of a final completion of the process of existence where the fact that existence had occurred was because of a deviation from some form of state of completion that was so perfect that it may be tantamount to there not being an existence. The deviation from that state of perfection was the creation of an existence which, the fact of it unfolding, implies that its unfolding would logically lead back towards the perfect state and that, at least according to the semantics of Hegel's philosophy, would be complete when the absolute state of existence will negate itself in a final determination of existence as a whole whereby no more progress can be made in the dimension of existence beyond the fact of its perfect completion having no more perfect state possible except as a final resolving of the redundancy of itself as being something which maintains a distinction. That last removal of the distinction of its existence is the only step which is left to occur.
+
+With Marx, he words himself on the topic of history by only commenting on history as it pertains to the history of man, so whether he considers that to be a subset of all of history, or whether he considers that question to be irrelevant is something we can never know, but at the very least it is the only history that he considers in his explications of a philosophy about the liberation and creation of man which is predicated on a process of dialectic which is itself a historical process.
+
+With all other modern incarnations of a historical dialectic, it describes a process based on history whereby the entire process of history is the unfolding of dialectical tension until the transformation of condition(s) is complete.
+
+Regardless of whether one wishes to comment that it somehow avoids being mystical by leaving it open that there's additional time and a greater overarching history of universe which exists before and beyond that dialectical process of history being described in a given collectivist or purely idealist doctrine, that it contends that the transformation of reality occurs through this process and that the qualitative aspects of that process are contained within a history which describes the unfolding of that process in its entirety makes it rather irrelevant whether or not that period is itself the entirety of history or not. The fact of the matter is that the description of that history which it does put forward is its metaphysical faith, and this cannot be ignored.
+
+### Remark on Hegelian Framing
+
+There is something to be said here about the insistence of being able to represent things in idealist terms. The problem about ascribing idealism to someone's view is that even if they themselves proclaim themselves as idealists, we can't really understand what's going on with anyone at whatever time they're speaking or as they're rationalizing something in mind, discourse or otherwise. I want to take the approach that we all likely go through modes of conception, perhaps even at all times, which are compatible with what we describe as idealism. We already agree that there is a subject/object split to a degree that a human being cannot look at any object and understand it in absolute terms - its complete structure, nature, composition, context towards a purpose, or whether it exists in context of no purpose at all. We can observe it and understand things about it and make inferences or contemplate shapes or feelings or patterns or concepts that are invoked or somehow influenced by it. Even if we are creating a geometric model or represented image as per our nervous system engaging with the object, or our conception of the object, and the activity of our visual cortex, that image is not the thing in question, and though by itself makes it an idea in its own rite and not necessarily the idea of the thing it's purported to be in reference to. The idea exists as an abstraction, and further abstractions are conjured even upon reflecting on the experience of perceiving that thing in question. It's difficult to really express the degree to which this can make a huge difference in someone's thinking*
 
 *I was somehow always surprised to see persons I had been close to, known for a long time, and gotten into difficult situations with and had been someone I could count on, at least in the most difficult of situations, in spite of the fact that my relationship with them may have contributed to, not necessarily whether I would ever get into such situations, but mechanistically in terms of the path, behaviour and temporality of my having reached those situations, and their disposition towards utterances and argumentation which, upon reflection, appeared to necessitate seeing aspects of the world that have been well tested and observed and experienced with a body, would be willing to pretend something is not true, or that something which should be true or for which the behaving and expecting or even simply hoping of it as being true might somehow bring a possibility of a change in the world !! TODO: complete*
 
@@ -1064,6 +1083,17 @@ Race exists and thus oppression exists - you must participate in racial praxis t
 
 There is something to be examined about the possible conception of a cognized object to represent each one's own race for which one has pride and some gnostic outlook carrying the hope of divination and absolution and that of a racial other, particularly one whose characteristic behaviour is to either impose or participate in the aesthetic of the gnostic construct.
 
+#### Remark on Colour Blindness
+We already know what the critique of those who believe in antiracism and who are against the notion of one being socially colourblind is because it's always a form of projection (and the Iron Law of Woke Projection never misses). They are seeking that modality in their interpretation of a person's body, and then they are experiencing the fact of they themselves judging that person and imagining the limitations and experience and rationale or motivations of a that person who has that body based on what they cognize as being the model of that body's behaviour, according to the colour and sex in this case, but it's of course something altogether abstract, so it's against whatever symbols they cognized at the moment that they conceive of either of those dimensions or the dimension which represents their combination
+
+But all of that aside, they are lulling themselves into believing they have the evidence of prejudicial experience concerning a stereotype, and they are experiencing that for whatever it's worth and whatever it actually pertains to in the real universe, as some kind of event. That projection is abhorrent, and should be ridiculed and condemned for its bigotry and idiocy, and especially because it's an attempt to perpetuate misery in hopes of compelling the world into transformation, even to the point of destruction if that's the only type of transformation that could take place. The sentiment driving that desire is completely toxic, and so it should be no surprise to anyone that, given the opportunity, it would seek transformation even if it means complete and utter annihilation.
+
+This is why obviously, in spite of them trying to prove to themselves (and succeeding, at least for themselves) that colourblindness doesn't "exist" because they keep thinking about colour, and they can't be assured that there's a totalizing force that will assuredly control every other human's experience such as to negate colour or race from the equation, let's say, we should denounce that complexly obscene behaviour and insist on colour blindness. It's actually the only alternative to an endless process of dehumanization (which would have to end with a material resolution to the differentiatedness of there being more than one being in our shared environment). Because the only possibility of justice, fairness and empathy between two beings is for them both to presuppose that the other could be a reflection of themselves, be it in the potential for experience, or understanding, or form, or what have you. There has to be a aligning in the perception of one or more of those things, and that's the key which unlocks the fairness in shared event.
+
+If you took those repugnant conceptual frameworks at their word, you would repeat their nonsense about having to see yourself represented, and you would forever find that even if I were to find, for example, a half Indian half Dutch man of equal dimensions, age, health, style, preference and opinion, I'd still be horrified to find that we aren't perfectly aligned and that somehow there could be some difference from which to produce an aberration from something hoped to be perfectly atoned contentment.
+
+So really there is no choice, because you'll never find that truly empathetic and openly curious view of anyone else's experience without inducing it through your logically deduced conclusion that it's simply better to do so because it makes your life better.
+
 ### Double Negation
 These constitute the forms of double negation that we are most familiar with, at the cultural level:
 - Classical Marxism: negate the process of negating the existing order